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INTRODUCTION
The story of marriage equality under state constitutions is quite mixed. The
story begins when the Hawaii Supreme Court in Baehr v. Lewin indicated that
strict scrutiny should be used for the prohibition of same-sex marriage on the
ground it was gender discrimination.1 The court explained that it was solely a
person’s sex that kept him or her from marrying someone of the same sex.2 The
Hawaii Court remanded the case to the lower court for the application of strict
scrutiny under the Hawaii Constitution’s use of this test for gender
discrimination. Before this could occur, though, Hawaii voters amended their
constitution to prevent marriage equality.3
The Vermont Supreme Court found a right to same-sex civil unions, but
not marriage for gay and lesbian couples.4 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court in a historic ruling interpreted its state constitution to create a

* Dean and Distinguished Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine, School of
Law.
1. 852 P.2d 44, 67-68 (Haw. 1993).
2. Id. at 60.
3. Article I, section 23 of the Hawaii Constitution provides: “The legislature shall have
the power to reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples.” HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23. This was
adopted by an initiative passed by sixty-nine percent of the citizens of Hawaii on November
3, 1998. See David Orgon Coolidge, The Hawaii Marriage Amendment: Its Origins,
Meaning and Fate, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 19 (2000).
4. Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864, 886 (Vt. 1999).
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constitutional right to marriage equality.5 It rejected that civil unions could
substitute for the right of gays and lesbians to marry. The New York Court of
Appeals, though, rejected marriage equality under its constitution in a four-totwo decision.6
The California Supreme Court, by a four-three margin, invalidated that
state’s ban on same sex marriage only to have its decision overruled about six
months later by an initiative, Proposition 8, to amend the state constitution.7
The Iowa Supreme Court unanimously found that the prohibition of same sex
marriage violated the Iowa Constitution.8
Meanwhile, over the course of the decade, voters in many states amended
their state constitutions to declare that marriage had to be between a man and a
woman and thus foreclose any chance of their state courts finding a right to
marriage equality.9 This limits the number of additional states where state
supreme courts can interpret their state constitutions to create a right to
marriage equality.
The conclusion which I draw from this quick review of history is that state
constitutional law is a necessary, but inadequate second best to advancing
individual liberties when that cannot be accomplished under the United States
Constitution. Ever since the Supreme Court turned sharply to the right with the
appointment of four justices by Richard Nixon early in his presidency, liberals
have thought of state constitutional law as an alternative. Supreme Court
Justice William Brennan in a famous article in the Harvard Law Review in
1977 urged this.10 Brennan called upon state courts to “step into the breach”
left by the U.S. Supreme Court’s retreat from its commitment to the protection
of individual rights in the wake of the Nixon appointments to the Court.11 A
wave of scholarship exalting state constitutional law developed. The late
Justice Stanley Mosk of the California Supreme Court observed that turning to
5. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003).
6. Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 5 (N.Y. 2006).
7. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 402 (Cal. 2008). In Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d

48, 63-64 (Cal. 2009), the California Supreme Court upheld Proposition 8.
8. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 872 (Iowa 2009).
9. See Jesse McKinley & Laura Goodstein, Bans in 3 States on Gay Marriage, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 5, 2008, at A1 (reporting that voters in Arizona, California, and Florida passed
initiatives to ban same-sex marriage); see also John L.S. Simpkins, Structuring State
Constitutional Review: Comparative Perspectives, 3 CHARLESTON L. REV. 535, 541 n.18
(2009) (“In 2004, for example, voters approved measures banning same-sex marriage in
Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
Ohio, Oregon, and Utah.”); Dan Savage, Op-Ed., Anti-Gay, Anti-Family, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
12, 2008, at A31 (reporting that Arkansas voters passed a state initiative to ban gay men and
lesbians from adopting children).
10. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protections of Rights, 90
HARV. L. REV. 489, 489 (1977).
11. Id. at 503; see also William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The
Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 535
(1986).
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state constitutions offered something for both liberals and conservatives: it is a
way for liberals to have a continuation of the Warren Court’s expansion of
constitutional rights, while at the same time providing conservatives “the
triumph of federalism.”12
Of course, it is not just in the area of marriage equality that lawyers have
turned to state courts and state constitutions to try and accomplish what could
not be done under the United States Constitution. For example, after the
Supreme Court in 1973 (with all four Nixon appointees in the majority) held in
San Antonio Board of Education v. Rodriguez that inequalities in school
funding do not violate the Constitution,13 a number of states found such
disparities to violate their state constitutions.14 Another illustration of this is
state courts recognizing a right under state constitutions to use private shopping
centers for speech purposes, although the Supreme Court has rejected such a
right under the United States Constitution.15
Yet, as someone who cares about civil liberties and civil rights, as a lawyer
as well as an academic, I am left with a somewhat ambivalent feeling about
state constitutional law. In every area where I would like to see state
constitutional rights develop, I would much prefer to see it accomplished under
the United States Constitution if possible. If it cannot be done that way, then I
am happy to see it done via state constitutions. Even then, I am aware of the
tremendous limits on state constitutional law as a way of advancing individual
liberties and civil rights.
My point in this Essay is thus straightforward: the ability to protect
individual rights through state constitutions is inherently limited. If the goal
cannot be accomplished via the United States Constitution, then state
constitutional law is a great back-up plan. But discussions of state
constitutional law must include this reality; state constitutional law is a second
best way to advance individual liberties and civil rights.
I divide this Essay into two parts. In Part I, I describe the inherent limits of
state constitutions as a way to protect individual liberties and civil rights. In
Part II, I apply this to explain why I believe that Ted Olsen and David Boies
made the right choice to bring a challenge to California’s Proposition 8 in
12. Stanley Mosk, State Constitutionalism: Both Liberal and Conservative, 63 TEX. L.
REV. 1081, 1081 (1985).
13. 411 U.S. 1, 4 (1973).
14. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929, 957-58 (Cal. 1977); Rose v. Council for
Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186, 189 (Ky. 1989); McDuffy v. Sec’y of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516,
555 (Mass. 1993); Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 408 (N.J. 1990); Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v.
McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139, 140-41 (Tenn. 1993); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby,
777 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1989).
15. Compare Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 521 (1976) (finding no First
Amendment right to use privately owned shopping centers for speech purposes), with
PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 79 (1980) (upholding decision of
California Supreme Court to recognize a state constitutional right to use privately owned
shopping centers for speech purposes).
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federal court as violating the United States Constitution.
To be clear, nothing in this essay is at all critical of lawyers who turn to
state courts or to state court judges to develop rights under state constitutions. I
was thrilled by the decisions of the Massachusetts, California, and Iowa
Supreme Courts recognizing state constitutional rights to marriage equality.
Sometimes the development of rights under state constitutions is an important
step to ultimately achieving national protection. I hope that is true with regard
to marriage equality. But I write this Essay to urge caution in generalizing too
much from a few pathbreaking decisions about the role of state constitutional
law in advancing freedom and equality.
I. THE LIMITS OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Some of the limits of state constitutional law are obvious, others less so.
But it is important to keep them in mind in any discussion of the potential for
using state constitutionalism as a way of achieving social change.
First, it must be remembered that states are limited by Supreme Court
decisions which impose constitutional limits on government actions. To take an
older example, during the first third of the twentieth century, the Supreme
Court interpreted the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
protect freedom of contract and struck down state laws that protected
employees and consumers, such as minimum wage and maximum hours laws.16
During this so-called Lochner era, the Court declared almost 200 laws
unconstitutional.17 There is nothing that state courts and state constitutionalism
could have done about this. Even a right to set a minimum wage under a state
constitution would have been struck down.
A more recent example would be constitutional limits the Supreme Court
has imposed on race-conscious remedies. In Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, the Court held that school districts may
not use race as a factor in assigning students to schools to achieve
desegregation unless they meet strict scrutiny.18 There is nothing any state in
its constitution can do to get around this requirement which limits the ability to
desegregate public schools.
In January 2010, the Supreme Court held that corporations have the First
Amendment right to spend unlimited amounts of money in election
campaigns.19 There is nothing that can be done to change this via state
constitutions because obviously they cannot limit what the Supreme Court

16. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (invalidating a state law limiting the
houses that bakers could work in a week), is regarded as the paradigm case of this era.
17. BENJAMIN WRIGHT, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 154 (1942).
18. 551 U.S. 701, 711 (2007) (invalidating school desegregation plans in Louisville,
Kentucky, and Seattle, Washington).
19. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 886 (2010).
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deems to be a First Amendment right.
The point is an important one: state constitutionalism has the ability to
protect rights where the Court says that none exist, but no ability to overcome
decisions that restrict what governments can do.
Second, relying on state constitutions never will provide more than partial
success in advancing liberties and equality because the chance of succeeding in
all states, or even most states, is small. This point is illustrated powerfully by a
single example: at most, how many state supreme courts across the country are
likely to recognize a constitutional right to marriage equality? Even if there had
been no amendments to state constitutions precluding this, it is difficult to
imagine it being more than a relative handful of states. When even the New
York Court of Appeals refused to recognize such a right,20 would it be realistic
to imagine the South Carolina Supreme Court or the Mississippi Supreme
Court or the Oklahoma Supreme Court doing so?
There are structural reasons to believe that significant advancement of
individual liberties is unlikely to occur in most states. In thirty-eight states,
state court judges face some form of electoral accountability.21 In some states,
state supreme court justices run in partisan elections. In other states, justices
face retention elections. The last two decades have seen a number of state
supreme court justices losing their seats because of particular rulings, such as
Rose Bird, Joseph Grodin, and Cruz Reynoso in California, Penny White in
Tennessee, and David Lanphier in Nebraska.22 Professor Devins, in an Article
in this issue, points out that none of the seven states that have recognized some
form of marriage equality make use of contested judicial elections.23 Certainly
this suggests that states with such systems are very unlikely to recognize such
controversial new rights.
Unquestionably, many issues of state constitutional law, even those
advancing rights, are unlikely to make much difference in elections. And some
justices on state supreme courts will be courageous and pay no attention to their
coming electoral review. But controversial rulings, whether equalizing
educational opportunity, limiting the death penalty, or providing marriage
equality, will provide a target for attack in the next electoral review. The late
California Supreme Court Justice Otto Kaus said that for the judge facing the
voters, electoral review is like having a crocodile in one’s bathtub; it is never
possible to forget that it is there.24 It would thus be naïve to assume that elected
20. Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 5 (N.Y. 2006).
21. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 36 (5th ed. 2007).
22. Rachel Paine Caufield, Reconciling the Judicial Ideal and the Democratic Impulse

in Judicial Retention Elections, 74 MO. L. REV. 573, 587 (2009) (describing defeat of
incumbent justices).
23. Neal Devins, How State Supreme Courts Take Consequences Into Account:
Towards a State-Centered Understanding of State Constitutionalism, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1629,
1675-79 (2010).
24. Dan Morain, Kaus to Retire from State Supreme Court: Deplores Strident Attacks
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judges and those facing retention elections will be as likely as federal judges
with life tenure to take controversial steps to advance liberty and equality.
Indeed, there are some areas where state constitutionalism just would never
happen. The easiest example here is the desegregation of the south. If the
Supreme Court had not decided Brown v. Board of Education,25 it is
unthinkable that many state courts in the south would have found that state
mandated segregation of schools violated state constitutions. The
implementation of Brown occurred entirely in the federal courts as a result of
courageous federal judges.26
Also, it is important to recognize that many states do not have a tradition of
using their state constitutions to provide rights greater than that in the United
States Constitution. Professor James Gardner, in one of the relatively few
articles criticizing state constitutionalism, conducted a careful review of the
decisions of a number of state supreme courts. He concluded: “Just as striking
as the infrequency of state constitutional decisions, and undoubtedly one of its
causes, is what can only be characterized as a general unwillingness among
state supreme courts to engage in any kind of analysis of the state constitution
at all.”27 In fact, Professor Gardner, after surveying states, proclaimed “that
state constitutional law today is a vast wasteland of confusing, conflicting, and
essentially unintelligible pronouncements.”28
Turning to state constitutions to protect rights means accepting inherently
limited success across the country. These successes in the face of failures in the
Supreme Court are surely better than nothing, but it would be a mistake to
pretend that it is more than a distant second best. Some states found rights to
educational equality in their state constitutions, but it would have been so much
better if the Supreme Court had done it nationally in San Antonio Board of
Education v. Rodriguez so that every state would have had this result.29
Third, using state constitutions to advance rights has far greater costs for
litigants than using the federal constitution. Again, the example of the
educational equity litigation is revealing. If the Court in Rodriguez would have
found that inequalities in school spending violated the United States
Constitution, there would have been no need to litigate this issue state by state
under state constitutions. One decision by the United States Supreme Court
finding a right to marriage equality for gays and lesbians would obviate the
on Justices in Anti-Bird Effort, L.A. TIMES, July 2, 1985, § 1, at 1.
25. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (declaring unconstitutional segregation of public schools
based on race).
26. See generally JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES (1981) (describing the federal judges
who implemented desegregation in the south).
27. James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L.
REV. 761, 781 (1992).
28. Id. at 763.
29. 411 U.S. 1, 4 (1973) (holding that inequalities in school funding do not violate
equal protection).
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need to litigate this state by state, with all of the costs inherent to such
litigation.
Obviously, the extent of the costs will vary by issue. In the area of
educational equity, it is reasonable to assume that even if Rodriguez had come
out the other way, there still would have had to be litigation in individual states
to implement it. Some issues, and marriage equality may be one of them, tend
to be more a matter of law than fact and thus the costs of litigation are reduced.
In some areas, it may be that even proceeding under the United States
Constitution will require that test cases be brought in several different places
around the country simultaneously, as was done in the school desegregation
litigation which culminated in Brown v. Board of Education.30
All of this is right, but it still is undoubtedly true that litigating under state
constitutions requires separate suits in each state and that is a far more
expensive strategy than succeeding under the United States Constitution. In a
world of inherently limited resources, especially for litigation to advance rights
and equalities, this often is a significant impediment to success.
Fourth, successes via state constitutional law often can be undone via the
initiative process. In most states, it is easier to amend the state constitution as
compared to the United States Constitution.31 Many states allow their state
constitutions to be amended through the initiative process. Thus, state court
decisions interpreting the state constitution to advance liberty or equality can be
undone through the electoral process. The most obvious example of this is how
the California Supreme Court’s decision creating a right to marriage equality
for gays and lesbians was overturned within six months by Proposition 8.32 The
same, of course, occurred in Hawaii as the voters amended the state’s
constitution after the Hawaii Supreme Court found that the state’s law
prohibiting same-sex marriage had to meet strict scrutiny.33
The initiative process also can be used to block state courts from being able
to use state constitutions to advance liberty and equality. Voters in many states
passed initiatives banning same sex marriages before their state courts could
even consider this.34 In a number of states, voters have passed initiatives to ban
affirmative action by state and local governments.35 In some states, initiatives
passed to ban busing for school desegregation or to eliminate open housing
laws.36
30. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
31. See THOMAS C. MARKS & JOHN F. COOPER, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 306-09

(2d ed. 2003); ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 359
(2009).
32. See Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009) (upholding Proposition 8 as a valid
amendment to the state constitution).
33. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
34. These are summarized supra note 9.
35. Proposition 209 in California and Proposition 2 in Michigan are examples of this.
36. See, e.g., Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982) (invalidating
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All of this points to a serious limit on reliance on state constitutions. State
constitutions are generally more majoritarian than the United States
Constitution because they are easier for the majority to change, such as through
the initiative process. Advancing individual liberties and furthering equality is
thus inherently more problematic under state constitutions because it puts the
rights of the minority more in the hands of the majority.
Fifth, there are costs and difficulties to having differences across the
country in many areas of individual rights. Protecting rights through state
constitutions rather than the United States Constitution thus can create
significant problems. For example, if some states, but not others, recognize
same-sex marriages there are countless problems. Will states that do not allow
same-sex marriages have to recognize them from states that do? What about
child custody decrees or rules about probating estates: how will these be
handled?
I am not arguing that these difficulties are reasons not to use state
constitutions. As someone who believes in marriage equality, I would rather
see it in a few states with these difficulties than see it nowhere and not have the
system face these problems. But it must be recognized that there are costs to
using state constitutions that are avoided if a national right is recognized by the
United States Supreme Court.
There are many responses to all of this. One powerful answer is that I
misunderstand the value of state constitutionalism; that its virtue is procedural
in that there is benefit to having states with their own robust constitutional
traditions. From this perspective, it is no criticism of state constitutional law if
it fails to find a right to marriage equality across the country. The criticism of
my argument is that I am assessing state constitutions in terms of their ability to
achieve particular results which I am assuming to be desirable and not
recognizing the benefits of state constitutionalism from a federalism
perspective.
But this criticism depends entirely on why people turn to state
constitutionalism. William Brennan’s seminal article on state constitutionalism
looked to it as a way of advancing liberties and equality at a time of
retrenchment by the United States Supreme Court. This focus on state
constitutions has intensified after the state court decisions in Massachusetts,
California, and Iowa finding a right to same-sex marriage. It is this aspect of
state constitutionalism to which I am responding: the hope for state
constitutions replacing the United States Constitution as a way of increasing the
protection for rights. It is this purpose that I am saying will never be achieved
as well at the state level as through the United States Constitution. I am not
opposed to states having robust constitutional law and will concede that there
are inherent benefits to this in terms of federalism. But it is when state
a Washington initiative prohibiting busing); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967)
(invalidating a state initiative repealing open housing laws).
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constitutions are looked to as a substitute for protecting rights under the United
States Constitution that I am skeptical of the possibility for success.
Another related criticism of what I have argued is that it ignores other
benefits of state constitutionalism. For example, state constitutions can be the
laboratories for experimentation that federalism often promises.37 There are
many examples where state courts interpreting state constitutions preceded and
arguably led to the greater recognition of rights under the United States
Constitution. The California Supreme Court found that a prohibition on
interracial marriage violated its state constitution more than twenty years before
the United States Supreme Court decided Loving v. Virginia and found that
anti-miscegenation laws deny equal protection.38
The reasoning of the state courts can influence subsequent decisions by the
Supreme Court. The experience of the states also can do this. Advocates of
marriage equality have reason to hope that as the country, including the justices
on the United States Supreme Court, see the experience in states like
Massachusetts and Iowa, they will see that there are no ills associated with
same-sex marriage.
I wholeheartedly agree with this argument, which is one of the reasons why
I strongly support using state constitutions and state courts when success at the
federal level is unlikely. Advocates of marriage equality surely made the right
choice in starting in state courts because it was too unlikely that they could win
in the United States Supreme Court at that stage and state victories could pave
the way for someday winning in the high court. But none of this is inconsistent
with my central point—that state constitutionalism is a second-best alternative
for advancing liberty and equality.
II. SHOULD PROPOSITION 8 BE CHALLENGED AS VIOLATING THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION IN FEDERAL COURT?
The choice by high profile lawyers David Boies and Ted Olsen to bring a
suit in federal court challenging Proposition 8 as violating the United States
Constitution caused consternation among gay and lesbian rights advocates who
had carefully structured their litigation to avoid such arguments.39 The
marriage equality litigation was brought in state courts based entirely on state
constitutions to keep the matter from being removed to federal court or ever
getting to the United States Supreme Court. In conversations with some of the
lawyers who litigated marriage equality cases in the states, they expressed to
37. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous
state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory . . . .”).
38. See Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948) (invalidating California ban on
interracial marriages); see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
39. See Maura Dolan, Prop 8 Foes Clash Over Federal Suit, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2009,
at A35.
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me great reservations about going to the Supreme Court too early and thus
risking a devastating loss. Their sense is that it would be more likely to win in
the Supreme Court after a series of wins in states and the Justices would have
had the chance to see that marriage equality has worked well.
I understand this argument and have great respect for the lawyers who
make it. But I think that going to federal court makes sense under the current
circumstances. For the reasons explained above, significant additional success
under state constitutions is unlikely. Indeed, the arguments made above in Part
I help to explain why it was desirable to have a federal constitutional challenge
to Proposition 8 brought in federal district court. Most states now have state
constitutional provisions which define marriage as being between a man and a
woman and few remaining state supreme courts can or will find a right to
marriage equality. Litigating state-by-state in addition to being unlikely to
succeed is far more expensive than success in one case that will affect the entire
country. In this way, the challenge to Proposition 8 now pending in federal
court really is a case study of the limits of state constitutional litigation
discussed in Part I.
Ultimately, the choice whether to go to federal court is a gamble about
Justice Anthony Kennedy. The conventional wisdom, which I share and discuss
more fully below, is that it is likely to be a five-to-four decision in the United
States Supreme Court with Justice Kennedy being the swing Justice in the
majority.
I agree with Boies and Olsen that there is good reason to believe that
Justice Kennedy would be a fifth vote to strike down bans on marriage equality.
In all of American history, there have been two Supreme Court decisions
protecting gays and lesbians; Anthony Kennedy was the author of both of
these. In Romer v. Evans, the Court, in a six-to-three decision, struck down a
Colorado initiative that repealed all laws in the state protecting gays and
lesbians from discrimination and precluded the enactment of any new such
laws.40 Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the majority found that the Colorado
initiative failed even rational basis review for failing to serve a legitimate
purpose. Justice Kennedy wrote:
Amendment 2 confounds this normal process of judicial review. It is at once
too narrow and too broad. It identifies persons by a single trait and then denies
them protection across the board. The resulting disqualification of a class of
persons from the right to seek specific protection from the law is
unprecedented in our jurisprudence.41

The Court was explicit that it could identify nothing behind the initiative except
animus for gays and lesbians. Justice Kennedy stated:
[L]aws of the kind now before us raise the inevitable inference that the
disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons

40. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
41. Id. at 633.

CHEMERINSKY - 62 STAN. L. REV. 1695 (DO NOT DELETE)

June 2010]

TWO CHEERS FOR STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

5/24/2010 10:26 PM

1705

affected. . . . Amendment 2, however, in making a general announcement that
gays and lesbians shall not have any particular protections from the law,
inflicts on them immediate, continuing, and real injuries that outrun and belie
any legitimate justifications that may be claimed for it.42

He concluded his majority opinion by declaring: “We must conclude that
Amendment 2 classifies homosexuals not to further a proper legislative end but
to make them unequal to everyone else. This Colorado cannot do.”43
The other case protecting gays and lesbians, of course, was Lawrence v.
Texas.44 In 1986, in Bowers v. Hardwick, the Supreme Court held that the right
to privacy does not include a right of adults to engage in private consensual
homosexual activity.45 In Lawrence, the Court expressly overruled Bowers.
Justice Kennedy wrote for a five-person majority, joined by Justices Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer.46 Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion declared:
“Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today. It
ought not to remain binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now
is overruled.”47
Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, concluded that the Texas law
prohibiting homosexual activity served no legitimate government purpose:
The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot
demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual
conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives
them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the
government. ‘It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of
personal liberty which the government may not enter.’ The Texas statute
furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the
personal and private life of the individual.48

Admittedly, Justice Kennedy made clear that the Court was not dealing
with the issue of marriage equality. He said that the case “does not involve
whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that
homosexual persons seek to enter.”49 Nor did the Court use heightened
scrutiny; the Court did not expressly say the level of scrutiny that is being
applied, but instead concluded that the Texas law would fail even rational basis
review because it served no legitimate purpose.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 634-35.
Id. at 635.
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
Justice O’Connor, the sixth justice in the majority in Romer, concurred in the
Lawrence judgment. She would not have overruled Bowers, but instead would have found
that the Texas law was unconstitutional because it applied only to same-sex sexual activity
and prohibited sex acts between same-sex couples that were allowed between opposite-sex
couples. The Georgia law, in Bowers, prohibited oral-genital and anal-genital contacts both
between same-sex and opposite-sex couples. 539 U.S. at 581 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
47. Lawerence, 539 U.S. at 578 (majority opinion).
48. Id. (internal citation omitted).
49. Id.
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These opinions by Justice Kennedy provide a good basis for believing that
he will be a fifth vote for a constitutional right to marriage equality. In both
Romer and Lawrence, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinions emphasized the
lack of a legitimate purpose behind the laws in question. Quite similarly, it is
difficult to identify any legitimate purpose served by keeping gays and lesbians
from expressing love and commitment through marriage and receiving all of
the benefits the law long has provided heterosexual couples who choose to
marry.50
I have participated in countless debates over marriage equality, including
in the campaign over Proposition 8. I am always struck by the absence of any
identifiable legitimate interest for the ban on same-sex marriage. What are the
arguments likely to be advanced before the Supreme Court to justify the denial
of marriage equality?
One argument is that marriage is inherently between opposite-sex couples.
But this is a definition, not an argument. The fact that marriage has traditionally
been between opposite-sex couples doesn’t reveal anything about the
characteristics of marriage and why those characteristics have to be limited to
opposite-sex couples. Under this form of argument, then laws that prohibited
interracial marriage were also constitutional. The Virginia law that prohibited
interracial marriage existed for almost three hundred years.51 If a long tradition
of prohibiting types of marriage is sufficient, then the Court came to the wrong
conclusion in Loving v. Virginia.52 Certainly, the existence of a practice over a
long period of time doesn’t tell us anything about whether that practice is
legitimate or permissible. Admittedly, Loving used strict scrutiny and it is
uncertain whether the Supreme Court would do so either under due process or
equal protection in examining the ban on marriage equality for gays and
lesbians. But if one thinks about all of the core characteristics of marriage, the
expression of love and commitment, the benefits and responsibilities, none of
these have anything to do with the sexual orientation of the individuals
participating.
A second argument that is likely to be advanced in the Court is that
marriage is inherently about procreation. Therefore, same-sex marriage doesn’t
make sense because same-sex couples can’t procreate without assistance. But
this argument is wrong on every possible level. Marriage, of course, isn’t
inherently about procreation. Couples are allowed to get marriage licenses,
even if one or both of them can’t or doesn’t want any children. Women past the
age of menopause can get marriage licenses, as can men who have been
50. Of course, advocates of marriage equality argue that strict scrutiny is appropriate
because a fundamental right, the right to marry, is at issue, and because sexual orientation
discrimination warrants heightened scrutiny. Obviously, if the Court were to use strict
scrutiny, then the bans on same-sex marriage would be unlikely to survive.
51. RACHEL F. MORAN, INTERRACIAL INTIMACY: THE REGULATION OF RACE AND
ROMANCE 19 (2001).
52. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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sterilized or are infertile. A requirement of intent to procreate does not exist for
heterosexual couples who want a marriage license, so there’s no sense to
impose it for same-sex couples. More importantly, same-sex couples do
procreate, whether it’s through artificial insemination or surrogacy or adoption.
Even if marriage is about procreation, there is no legitimate reason to deny this
to same-sex couples because they have children too.
A third argument that’s made is that children do better when they have
opposite-sex parents than same-sex parents and thus the government is justified
in denying marriage licenses for same-sex couples. No less than President
George W. Bush made this argument.53 He said the social science data shows
that children do better if they have parents of opposite gender.54 At the outset,
it is important to note that is not what the studies say; the studies that are
pointed to are ones that talk about children with single parents often having
more problems than children with two parents.55 But that has nothing do to
with sexual orientation. It does reflect that being a parent is enormously
difficult and, as somebody who has always been lucky enough to have a partner
in parenting, I can only imagine how difficult it is to be a single parent of a
child. But that doesn’t at all relate to the issue of whether or not same-sex
couples should get marriage licenses.
But most of all, the problem with this argument is that it truly misses the
point. The question is not whether same-sex couples should have children or
not. The reality is that same-sex couples are going to have children. The
question becomes whether children of same-sex couples are better off if their
parents are married or unmarried. I know of no studies that have been done that
compare children with same-sex parents who are married to children of
same-sex parents who are unmarried. Same-sex marriage is so new, not only in
the United States but around the world, that time is needed to do such studies.
Everything that we understand about marriage and how it contributes to the
stability of relationships would indicate that children with same-sex parents are
better off if those parents are married than unmarried because marriage is more
likely to lead to stable relationships.
The point isn’t: would children do better with parents of opposite gender or
same gender. The point is: given that there are children in same-sex couples,
are they better off with their parents being married or unmarried? As Chief
Judge Judith Kaye of the New York Court of Appeals declared:
The State plainly has a legitimate interest in the welfare of children, but
excluding same-sex couples from marriage in no way furthers this interest. In
fact, it undermines it. Civil marriage provides tangible legal protections and
economic benefits to married couples and their children, and tens of thousands
of children are currently being raised by same-sex couples in New York. . . .
53. See Benedict Carey, Experts Dispute Bush on Gay-Adoption Issue, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 29, 2005, at A16.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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The State’s interest in a stable society is rationally advanced when families are
established and remain intact irrespective of the gender of the spouses.56

A fourth argument that is often made against same-sex marriage is that it
will harm the institution of marriage. I confess that I don’t understand the
argument. No heterosexual couple’s marriage is adversely affected in the
slightest by virtue of gays and lesbians also being able to marry. In fact, I
cannot think of anything that has been more affirming of the institution of
marriage in my lifetime than the fight by gays and lesbians to be able to marry.
A related argument sometimes advanced is that there is a slippery slope,
that recognizing a constitutional right to marriage equality for gays and lesbians
will prevent states from imposing any limits on marriage and force states to
recognize marital arrangements such as polygamy. The crucial question would
be whether states can show that there is a sufficiently important government
interest to justify the ban on polygamy. No such interest exists with regard to
marriage between gays and lesbians. Whether such an interest exists with
regard to polygamy would need to be litigated. Traditionally, the arguments
against polygamy are based on the subordination of women historically
attendant to it and the benefit for children in monogamous marriages. If these
can be shown, then the ban on polygamy could be upheld even after the ban on
same-sex marriages was deemed to violate the United States Constitution.
The lack of a plausible legitimate argument against marriage equality for
gays and lesbians leads to the same conclusion that Justice Kennedy came to in
Romer: the laws are really based on animus towards gays and lesbians and the
type of moral disapproval of homosexual activity that the Court rejected in
Lawrence. It is what convinces me not only that Justice Kennedy is likely to
vote to strike down Proposition 8, but also that Justices Stevens, Ginsburg,
Breyer, and Sotomayor (or replacements for them picked by President Obama)
will do so.
Admittedly, the Supreme Court’s five-to-four decision banning the
televising of the trial over Proposition 8 in January 2010 gives some pause
because Justice Kennedy joined with Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia,
Thomas, and Alito, sure opponents of a right to marriage equality.57 This vote
led some to see the ruling as a harbinger of Justice Kennedy siding with the
conservatives on the issue of marriage equality and saying that it was a mistake
to take the matter to federal court.58 This is certainly possible, though it is also
possible that his vote reflects his views about cameras in the courtroom more
than about the underlying merits of the issue. There will be no way to know,
though, until the Court takes and decides the case on the constitutionality of
Proposition 8.

A1.

56. Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 32 (N.Y. 2006) (Kaye, C.J., dissenting).
57. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 130 S. Ct. 705 (2010).
58. David G. Savage, Prop. 8 Ruling Seen as an Omen, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2010, at
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My central point is that I think in light of the limits of state
constitutionalism, Justice Kennedy’s prior opinions, and the underlying merits,
it was a sensible decision to bring a challenge to Proposition 8 in federal court
based on the United States Constitution. The timing also makes sense because
the Supreme Court is not likely to be more hospitable to such a suit for at least
a decade. None of the other conservatives are likely to leave the high court
before then; John Roberts is fifty-five in 2010, Samuel Alito is sixty in 2010,
Clarence Thomas will be sixty-two, Antonin Scalia and Anthony Kennedy will
turn seventy-four. There is every reason to believe that they could still be on
the bench in 2017 even if there are two Obama terms. Rather than litigate under
state constitutions for another decade, Boies and Olsen made a good gamble in
light of the limits on state constitutionalism that they can win in the United
States Supreme Court.
CONCLUSION
Over the years, I have been invited to participate in many conferences on
state constitutional law and always have declined. I am not a critic of relying on
state constitutions to advance liberties and equality. I hope that in countless
areas state supreme courts will use their constitutions to achieve what cannot be
done under the United States Constitution because of the conservative Supreme
Court.
But I also always have thought of state constitutional law as a second best
way to accomplish desirable results. In this article, I have tried to explain why
and thus why turning to the United States Constitution to challenge Proposition
8 made a great deal of sense.
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